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Risk management is a topic
close to my heart and my career as an
academic, consultant, and now policy-
maker. In this message, I￿d like to reflect
on the advances that the financial
services industry has made over the past
decade in risk-management practices, as
well as the challenges we still face.
But before I recount that story,
I￿d like to point out a subtle but
substantive change that has occurred in
this area since I began my study of risk
management in the financial services
sector. Now, both industry and regula-
tors recognize that we share a vision and
a vested interest in enhancing the
industry￿s risk-management strategies.
As a result, a joint effort is taking place
to raise risk-management standards for
the entire industry. As I will note later,
this is both a major advance and a
substantial improvement for the industry
and its regulation.
he banking industry and its regulators
recognize that they share a vested
interest in enhancing the industry￿s
risk-management strategies. In his
first Business Review message of 2003, President
Santomero discusses three points: risk management
as its own distinct discipline; the financial industry￿s
work to improve risk-management techniques
and regulators￿ increased commitment to
risk-focused examinations; and the need to improve
risk-management systems even further.
 I will emphasize three main
points here: One, over our recent past,
the practice of risk management has
evolved as its own separate and distinct
discipline. Two, as this evolution has
taken place, the financial industry has
worked to improve risk-management
techniques, and regulators have
indicated an increased commitment to
risk-focused examinations. Three, as the
industry evolves, risk-management
systems will need to improve even
further and become a greater part of
firms￿ decision-making process. In fact,
an emphasis on risk-management
capability will be an increasing part of
the supervisory process.
I will also look at what is
needed to be successful in the effort to
raise risk-management standards. But
before we embark on the future of risk
management, let￿s look at where we
have been.
PROGRESS SINCE 1996
In 1996, I helped write a best-
practices study of risk management in
the financial services industry, which
was financed by the Sloan Foundation
and conducted under the auspices of
the Wharton Financial Institutions
Center. That study included discussion
of what institutions were actually doing
and what had yet to be done. At the
time, the industry had finally reconciled
itself to the fact that banking is an
inherently risky business. Institutions
had gone from trying to avoid risk to
developing techniques to manage
different types of risk, with credit risk
and market risk taking center stage. In
each case, the risk was being identified
and quantified.
For the most part, credit risk
concerns centered on newly discovered
concentrations. And the growing threat
of volatility here and abroad led to new
developments to measure and limit
trading risk. In fact, it could be argued2   Q1  2003 Business Review www.phil.frb.org
that industry interest in risk manage-
ment as a profession developed almost
by accident. While efforts were already
under way to formalize the activity, the
practice really received industry buy-in
only when everyone realized the
mistakes of the past: over-concentra-
tions in credit and excessive trading risk
levels.
Back then, lip service was
given to operational risk too, but little
analytical work had been done on the
subject. Less quantifiable risks, such as
reputation, regulatory, or strategic risk,
were managed less formally or simply
ignored. CEOs had these issues on their
radar screens, but virtually no substan-
tive analysis existed.
Risk aggregation was seen as a
major issue for the industry; there was a
clearly perceived need to install an
organizational structure to oversee risk
management at the firm level. But this
was a new and controversial concept.
The title ￿risk czar￿ was being floated,
but not everyone was sure where this
function fit into the organizational
structure. In fact, different organizations
had different solutions to the manage-
ment of firm-level risk.
Since then, much has been
accomplished. Risk management has
become an increasingly prevalent ￿
and accepted ￿ industry discipline.
Firms have rushed to develop systems
and install processes to manage the risks
that are an inevitable part of the
financial landscape. Firms now under-
stand that risks of various types,
embedded throughout their portfolios,
must be managed both carefully and
rigorously. Collectively, they impose an
aggregate level of risk that can threaten
the very solvency of the firm.
Now, risk assessment is a
standard part of every deal, every
strategic discussion, and every financial
review. Firms recognize all risks are
ultimately related and strive to focus
their efforts on total enterprise risk.
Moreover, a clear role for the firm-level
risk manager has emerged. We have
come a long way. Risk-management
systems have been developed and
implemented as firms have forged a new
risk-management culture. And the
result, at least in part, has been a decade
of high earnings and overall stability in
the banking industry.
In fact, the last decade can be
distinguished by what did not happen,
rather than what did. Volatile markets
did not lead to the spectacular losses of
past cycles. The Asian crisis left trading
firms relatively unscathed. The
technology industry bubble brought
down no major financial institutions and
resulted in manageable credit losses.
And profits, capitalization, and solvency
ratios improved throughout the industry
￿ despite the recent recession and a
series of extraordinary domestic and
international events.
In short, the past decade has
proven the increased ability of the
industry to manage risk and has
demonstrated the benefits of substan-
tially improved risk-management
capacity.
This has not been lost on
regulators, who themselves have
embraced the new discipline of risk
management. The results of regulators￿
efforts are also evident. By the mid-
1990s, regulators had made the very
practical move to risk-based examina-
tions rather than just looking at point-in-
time balance sheets and financial ratios.
Interestingly, as the financial
system became more complex, regulators
encouraged more private-sector
innovation, in the belief that markets
are quite efficient at sorting out their
own best practices. The Fed￿s own
philosophy is that flexible yet watchful
supervision, complemented by market
discipline, is the best approach to ensure
a safe and stable financial system.
Yet, more needed to be done
on the regulatory front and still does. As
the industry￿s approach to risk manage-
ment became more sophisticated, so did
its systems and business practices. Early
in this process regulation had to play
catchup. For example, capital arbitrage
became a common practice, and this led
regulators to reassess the very founda-
tion of capital regulation framework
instituted in the late 1980s.
The once-innovative regula-
tory regime established with the Basel
Accord concentrated exclusively on
credit risk but had only a handful of risk
categories and totally ignored both
trading and interest-rate risk, as well as
correlations across risk categories.
Changes in the intervening decade
attempted to retrofit the regulations by
adding trading risk and interest-risk
considerations to the standards. But the
results were never fully satisfactory. The
outcome was both regulatory arbitrage
and avoidance. In time, it became clear
that Basel I had become obsolete.
Regulation had fallen behind, and it was
time for something new.
Interestingly, as the financial system
became more complex, regulators
encouraged more private-sector
innovation, in the belief that markets
are quite efficient at sorting out their own
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BASEL II
The Basel Accord￿s shortcom-
ings prompted the Bank for Interna-
tional Settlements to revamp and
update international capital regulation
in the living document known as Basel
II. In general terms, the goal of this
effort is to update the earlier model of
risk-related capital regulation in light of
current market instruments and modern
financial techniques.
Nonetheless, Basel II should be
seen as quite distinct from predecessor
regulations in at least one important
respect: It is an effort to engage both the
industry and the regulators in using
advanced risk-management techniques.
This shows through in two important
ways. First, whereas Basel I focused only
on regulatory capital adequacy, Basel II
gives equal consideration to minimum
capital ratios, supervisory review, and
market discipline. Second, substantial
effort has been made to incorporate the
risk management practices that firms
actually use into the process and to
increase the risk sensitivity of the
minimum capital requirements.
 While a considerable ad-
vance, Basel II has its critics. One
common complaint is that the current
proposal is too complex. Is it? Yes.
However, its complexity reflects the
underlying complexity of risk and risk
management in modern banking
institutions. Is it doable? I believe so. In
fact, by proposing the use of a bank￿s
own risk-management system in the
advanced internal risk-based (or IRB)
approach, Basel II engages the banking
industry￿s risk-management community
in determining appropriate bank risk
levels and regulatory capital ratios.
In its present form, the
advanced IRB approach is designed to
employ the advanced risk-management
systems that banks have in place for
day-to-day operations in the determina-
tion of capital adequacy. Regulators will
need to certify that a bank￿s systems are
up to the task, and in many cases, this
may require substantial improvement of
the systems. However, the approach is
one where banking firms and regulators
will need to work together to improve
the existing best practices in the
industry. Just as Basel I became obsolete,
Basel II will not be the final word on
risk-management regulation. But it is a
step forward in that its structure works
to encourage the industry and regulators
toward better risk-management
practices. In this way, the industry itself
can lead in the evolution of risk
management ￿ as ultimately it should.
Some critics of Basel II feel
that it crosses the line and makes bank
regulators into bank managers. This is
not our intention, and we recognize that
this is a potential danger that needs to
be avoided. In addition, some bankers
question whether regulators have the
expertise to properly assess banks￿
systems. This is a legitimate concern,
and it highlights the necessity of
regulators everywhere to intensify their
efforts in the areas of appropriate staff
development and training.
While these are potential
problems, we cannot gain the benefits of
incorporating banks￿ internal risk-
management practices into regulatory
capital unless regulators conduct
appropriate analysis to ensure the
adequacy of industry practice. Without
sufficient supervisory review, it would
simply be imprudent to defer to internal
ratings for appropriate oversight of
industry risk levels.
 The banking industry is
littered with firms that confidently
talked the talk of safety and soundness
but fell flat when it came to walking the
walk. As regulators, we need the
assurance that risk-management systems
are, in fact, advanced in both theory
and practice. This assurance can come
only from supervisors￿ gaining first-hand
knowledge of bank operations.
To illustrate this point, let me
tell you about an experience I had
during my days as a risk-management
consultant. I visited a major financial
institution in New York to assess its
approach to trading risk. The CEO
assured me that the bank had a highly
sophisticated VAR risk-management
system already in place. The CFO said
they had just implemented it. The head
of trading said they were about to
implement it. And the traders ￿ well,
they￿d never heard of it.
So, in this case, senior manage-
ment thought that it had an advanced
trading risk-management system in
place and everything was under control.
But the facts were that the organization
had its traders taking million-dollar
positions with few controls in place. You
can see why regulators might get
nervous.
THE FUTURE
As to the future of risk
management, the most important thing
to keep in mind is that Basel II sets the
stage for a joint effort and further
advances in the science and art of risk
Basel II sets the right incentives for the
industry to continue to seek advances in risk
management and for regulators to continue to
improve their skills in assessing the adequacy
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management. Basel II sets the right
incentives for the industry to continue
to seek advances in risk management
and for regulators to continue to
improve their skills in assessing the
adequacy of risk-management systems
in use. Together, industry leaders and
regulators can work to raise the
standards of risk management for the
industry.
The next stage in this process is
at hand: the third round of quantitative
impact studies, the so-called QIS 3, was
launched last October.   This study
allows banks to assess how Basel II will
affect their particular institution.
On the international level, a
regulatory Accord Implementation
Group has been formed to assure the
industry that common approaches and a
level playing field will emerge from the
implementation process scheduled for
the end of 2006 for internationally
active banks.
The special and unique
element of Basel II is that it allows for an
internal risk-based approach. The best
banks will be able to step forward and
define best practices for the industry.
While earlier methods dictated across-
the-board regulation, now regulators are
looking to the industry for valid
approaches and new insights. Perhaps
under Basel II, bankers and regulators
will build the true relationship of trust
and understanding that did not emerge
under Basel I.
As a central bank responsible
for the financial integrity of the
financial system, the Federal Reserve
sees the development of adequate risk-
management systems as an important
part of its balanced approach to bank
supervision. As such, evaluating a bank￿s
ability to establish an appropriate risk-
management regime in the bank￿s
culture has become a more important
part of the bank regulation and
supervision process.
The challenges still facing
bankers, regulators, and risk managers
are well known. Everyone involved in
risk management probably has his or her
own list of projects that warrant industry
attention. This is just part of the
evolution of risk management.
Let me offer my list, for what it
is worth. On credit risk, while tech-
niques have improved, much work still
needs to be done on consistency,
transparency of process, and the
timeliness of review.
On the commercial loan side,
data on actual outcomes are still too
scarce. On the retail side, many of the
risk models are largely proprietary and of
unknown reliability. The recent
controversy surrounding the regulators￿
approach to retail risk quantification
speaks more to the lack of a consensus
on a standard approach to retail risk
management than anything else.
On the market risk side, many
questions still require ongoing investiga-
tion and continual monitoring. The
robustness of the models and systems
continues to be questioned. Market
valuations of complex instruments are
subject to debate ￿ perhaps now more
than ever. And the estimated correla-
tions across markets seem to change too
frequently to provide a useful guide for
risk-management purposes.
On operational risk, we have
even less knowledge and capability,
even though contingency issues seem to
loom larger now than ever before. Basel
II has included operational risk in pillar
one but permits an advanced manage-
ment approach to the setting of an
appropriate capital level. Yet, little work
has been done on measuring operational
risk systematically, and insufficient
public data exist to test the validity of
different approaches.
However, perhaps the greatest
challenge is the issue of appropriate risk
aggregation. Whether it is the correla-
tion of risks within product lines or
across them, this is one area of signifi-
cant disagreement. This was an open
issue some years ago, and it is still the
subject of much discussion and debate.
As we know, risk aggregation
presents a fundamental problem. What
is the correlation across different credit
exposures? How can we aggregate
different types of risk to measure the
firm￿s total exposure? What is the
correlation across different types of risk?
How can we add up the risks associated
with September 11, WorldCom,
Argentina, and retail loan losses?
Quantifying divergent risks and
reaching some logical conclusion have
proven to be a daunting task. We don￿t
have all the answers yet, which is why
we had better keep working.
But risk aggregation isn￿t the
only open issue. We also need to figure
out how to allocate capital within the
firm to create incentive schemes that
foster appropriate risk attitudes. And we
need to address the pro-cyclicality of
risk in any risk-based capital allocation
system. This last issue remains a
challenge. Exactly how stable should
capital allocation algorithms be over a
business cycle? And does the answer to
this question differ at the firm level and
at the regulatory level? Another open
issue is how organizations should be
structured to reflect risk-management
priorities.
These are complex issues, and
they raise questions we are still trying to
answer. All of this suggests the status
quo will not be good enough for
tomorrow ￿ indeed, it is probably not
good enough for today.
We need to address
the pro-cyclicality
of risk in any
risk-based capital
allocation system.   Business Review  Q1  2003   5 www.phil.frb.org
Basel II, while a significant
improvement, is just a step in an
industry-wide movement toward better
and more effective risk management.
This is where the joint effort of industry
leaders and regulators is invaluable. We
must work together to make our best
practices even better. It will take a lot of
innovation and leadership from the
industry. It will also take a lot of
flexibility and direction from regulators.
Basel II sets a deadline of 2006
for implementation of adequate risk-
management systems. Meeting that
deadline will require the same effort
and speed of scientific advance that we
have seen thus far. And it is imperative
that risk-management systems improve
and become an even greater part of
bank management￿s decision process.
Indeed, the industry has already
become more mindful of the new
regulatory guidelines ￿ guidelines that
hold the industry and its systems to a
higher standard. But improvement in
risk-management practices is not just
imperative because of regulatory
mandate; it is a necessary component of
good banking in a world of increasing
complexity and evolution of the
financial services industry.
CONCLUSION
The financial sector has come
a long way in its risk-management
efforts. From the early days of simple
ratios or simply risk avoidance, risk
management has evolved into a
complex, dynamic discipline of its own.
Basel II offers an unusual
opportunity for banking issues to be
resolved by those who will live with the
result on a daily basis ￿ the bankers. It
makes sense, and I believe it will be very
effective. Bankers know what is best for
their banks. They will have the principal
responsibility for setting their own
course.
But there is more at stake here
than the profitability and health of any
single institution. The integrity and
stability of the financial system is critical
to the health of our economy. So banks
must be prepared to defend their own
assessments and procedures to their
regulators and the market. If a bank is
using the internal ratings-based
approach, it should be prepared to
provide concrete evidence and support
for its systems. Regulators will expect it. I
believe banks have the capability to
successfully innovate and restructure to
meet the requirements of this new, more
rigorous environment.   Banks and
regulators should and will continue to
work together to ensure risk-manage-
ment processes are sufficiently robust
and ultimately effective. We can take
pride in the fact that we have already
done so much. Yet, we have much work
ahead of us. It will not be easy, and it
will not be completed overnight. B R